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S

ignificant change is occurring in the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Dramatic change
has already occurred on the operational side as the AAF has significantly expanded and modernized in the past seven years. The air force added C-208s,
C-130s, and MD-530s to the fleet, and in 2016 the first four A-29s arrived.1 These
platforms provide the AAF with airlift, search and rescue, and attack capability as
coalition forces have transitioned to a train, advise, and assist role and relegated
combat operations to Afghan forces. Change is also on the horizon for support functions of the AAF. Specifically, a transition of financial responsibility from US to Afghan
processes is underway. The current AAF construct, however, is ill-suited to facilitate

4 | Air & Space Power Journal

Improving Resource Management in the Afghan Air Force

this transition. No mechanism exists to effectively transition aviation unique requirements from coalition to Afghan control under the extant financial construct. Additionally, the lack of authorities in the resource allocation process is a significant problem for
the AAF as it resides under the Afghanistan National Army (ANA). Thus, this article examines the current resource allocation problems the AAF is experiencing and subsequently provides a road map to ameliorate these issues through organizational change.
We analyze the AAF through extensive interviews of coalition advisors and Headquarters (HQ) AAF personnel. In conjunction with the information acquired from
these interviews, we utilize the accumulated knowledge gained from one year of
field work training, advising, and assisting at HQ AAF. The research is scoped to the
AAF’s financial and procurement processes and encompasses a thorough examination of the ongoing resource allocation problems they face today. Additionally, we
analyze how widespread corruption in Afghanistan is adversely impacting the resource allocation process.2 Thus, this article seeks to determine solutions to the resource allocation problems the AAF is currently experiencing.

Afghanistan National Army Force Structure
There are several components that encompass the force structure for the ANA.
The Ministry of Defense (MoD) is one of 24 ministries in the Afghan government.3
The MoD, along with the general staff, are responsible for those functions necessary to ensure operational readiness for the ANA.4 ANA combat forces are divided
into six geographically numbered corps (201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 209th, and
215th) plus a capital region division in Kabul. (see Figure 1)5 This corps construct
resulted from the reestablishment of the ANA after the fall of the Taliban in 2002
and stabilized to its current six corps plus capital region form in 2009. Each of the
six regional corps manages one to four brigades which are comprised of multiple
battalions (called kandaks in Afghanistan). As of March 2016, the ANA had 203,000
people with approximately 7,400 of those personnel designated as AAF.6
209th
Corps

201 st
Corps
207th
Corps

111th
Capital Division
203rd
Corps

205th
Corps
215th
Corps

Figure 1. Afghan Army Corps (reproduced from GAO)7
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The Afghan Air Force resides within the ANA and not as a separate component.
The AAF is comprised of three wings (Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand), an AAF
headquarters, and an Air Academy (Pohantoon-e-Hawayee, dubbed PeH). In total,
there are 34 units attached to the three AAF wings. It is important to understand
that these units are geographically dispersed throughout the country and reside
within the ANA corps construct. As a result, control resides with the corps. The
ANA corps manage the AAF units that fall within their purview like a typical army
unit (i.e. like an infantry brigade). This ANA–AAF relationship and its implications
for allocating resources will be explored in subsequent sections.

The Ministry of Defense Budget Landscape
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. As a war-torn country
with a literacy rate of only 31 percent,8 Afghanistan has struggled to generate a sustainable economy. In 2015, Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
was $672 US dollars (USD), compared to that of the US GDP per capita of $56,596
USD and the world GDP per capital of $15,800 USD. Using this metric, Afghanistan
ranks as the 16th poorest country in the world.9 Afghanistan levies a progressive
income tax system, with the top tax bracket at 20 percent.10 However, the generation of revenue remains low. Corruption in income and sales tax collection remains
problematic as the collection system lacks the necessary checks and balances. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) states that “systematic corruption of tax officials is a serious threat to future tax collection.”11 As a result, much of Afghanistan’s revenue comes from international donor nations.
The MoD budget mirrors the economic reality in Afghanistan. The majority of
the funding supporting the MoD is a result of donor nations. Seventy–three percent
of MoD funding (as shown in Figure 2) comes from the United States. Almost 10
percent is provided by other donor nations through the NATO Trust Fund, with 8.6
percent coming from the United Nations Development Program. The Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) only directly contributes 8.6 percent
of the total MoD budget.
406.6, 8.6%
2,024.5, 42.8%
405.2, 8.6%

455.7, 9.6%

GIRoA
NATO TF
United Nations
U.S. - ON Budget

1,424.1, 30.3%

Figure 2. MoD fiscal year 2017 budget commitments
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The execution of US-funded MoD requirements are designated as either “on-budget”
or “off-budget” (see also Figure 2). The designation as on- or off-budget denotes
which acquisition processes will be employed to procure the end item. Off-budget
requirements are contracted and managed through US processes. For example, the
purchase of an aircraft platform (e.g. A-29) for the AAF is completed as a pseudoforeign military sale. The contracting and management of that purchase is completed through the A-29 Systems Program Office at Wright–Patterson AFB, Ohio.
While the end item (the A-29) is delivered and signed over to the Afghans, the processes that resulted in that delivery are completely outside of Afghan channels.
Currently, aircraft platforms, contracted logistics support maintenance, and pilot
training are all off-budget AAF requirements.
On-budget funds are executed through the Afghan MoD acquisition processes.
Requirements are vetted through a requirements acquisition board and upon approval are executed by the internal Afghan procurement process. Coalition members
are available to advise on these processes, but they do not have a direct role in the
execution of funds. Typical on-budget requirements are for base and life support:
ground fuel, electricity, water, food, firewood, and clothing. Therefore, the important distinction between on- and off-budget is not the source of the funds, but rather
the execution of the funds.
The designation of an item as on- or off-budget is becoming increasingly important.
US forces in Afghanistan continue to draw down from a peak of more than 100,000
troops in 2010 to a projected force of 5,500 by 2017.12 As a result, more items transition
each year from off- to on-budget. These coalition forces are focused on actively training, advising, and assisting on Afghan financial and procurement processes with the
goal to eventually transition all requirements to the Afghan on-budget process.

Current Ministry of Defense Budget Process
To understand the problems the AAF is encountering in the resource allocation
process, it is first imperative to possess foundational knowledge of the current MoD
budget process. All 24 ministries in the Afghanistan government are designated as
primary budgetary units (PBU).13 A PBU is a legal entity of the state with appropriation provided to it under an act of the National Assembly. Afghan law determines
the specific budget amounts appropriated for each PBU. The MoD, as one of the 24
ministries, is a PBU with a specified budget. Thus, fund authority flows from the
MoF to the MoD (See Figure 3).
The Ministry of Defense–Finance (MoD–F) is the financial arm of the MoD. It is
analogous to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller in the United
States. The MoD–F accounts for and monitors the funds the MoD receives. There
are 13 budget builders, including the MoD–F, in the MoD as shown in Figure 3. Budget builders collect requirements, build spend plans, and request funds through the
Afghan budget generation process. Once a budget is approved, the budget builder
receives the allotment of funds for their areas of responsibility. There are two types
of budget builders. The budget builders are either general staff budget builders or
MoD organizational budget builders. The primary difference between the two types
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of budget builders is whether they serve in a numbered staff function (general staff)
or a specified organizational function (MoD organization). The general staff budget
builders are aligned similarly to the US numbered structure that is rooted in the
nineteenth–century French army continental staff system. For example, the General Staff Chief of Communications (GSG6) is the budget builder for communications like J6 is communications in the Department of Defense. The GSG6 budget
builder is responsible for all communication unique requirements. Similarly, items
that are common to all units (e.g. office supplies) flow through the logistics budget
builder—the GSG4. In addition to the general staff budget builders, there are MoD
organization budget builders. For example, acquisition, technology, and logistics is a
MoD organizational budget builder.

Ministry of Finance (MoF)
Ministry of Defense Finance (MoD-F)

MoD
“Line Ministry”

Primary Budget Unit

GS
Medical

GS
Eng

Budget Builders (13)
MoD
Intelligence

MoD
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Regional Corps (6)

MoD
CPMD

GSG2

GSG4

GSG6

MoD
Strategic Comm.
& Public Affairs

MoD
Disaster

GSG7
MoD
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209
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Secondary Budget Unit

Corps-Level Reps to
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Religious
and Cultural

Within each
Secondary Budget Unit

Kabul Wing

Kandahar Wing

Shindand Wing

Figure 3. Current Ministry of Defense process

The PBU has the authority to provide suballotments of funds to secondary budget
unit (SBUs) for management.14 Thus, SBUs consist of offices of PBUs that have been
delegated responsibility for financial management. When this occurs, the SBU becomes the crucial unit of control. All of the corps from Figure 1 are SBUs.
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Significant authorities are conferred by SBU designation. Specifically, the SBU is
the entity that has ownership and authorities over all the subordinate units’ requirements. For example, the 205th Corps (in the Kandahar area of Afghanistan as shown
in Figure 1) has ownership of four brigades and their subordinate units. This includes
the AAF Kandahar wing and all other AAF units located in the geographic area of
the corps. As an SBU, the 205th Corps receives individual budget suballotments from
the 13 budget builders and controls the dissemination of that suballotment to the
brigades and wing underneath it. Designation as an SBU results in other authorities
that are not strictly financial. For example, an SBU has procurement authority. It can
approve contracts under various threshold limits.15 When these items are procured,
they are stored in facilities called depots. Depots in Afghanistan contain anything
from paper and pens to spare parts. Gaining access to the items in the depots requires signatory authority.16 This signatory authority resides at the SBU level. Therefore, a SBU not only has financial and procurement authority but also possesses
control of the dissemination of procured items through the depot system. Thus, the
authorities that come from SBU designation result in great power.

Current Resource Allocation Problems for AAF
The current construct is causing multiple problems in the resource allocation
process for the AAF. First, there is no financial focal point at the MoD-level that can
provide a holistic aviation picture. None of the 13 current budget builders (see Figure 3) are designed to support aviation unique requirements. Rather, they are designed for support functions (e.g. GSG2, GSG7, etc.) and other organizational needs
(MoD organizations) but not aviation unique requirements. This is not to say the
structure as a whole is broken. The current construct is effectively designed to account for those items that are crosscutting across brigades or wings. For example,
computers are common to all units in the MoD whether they are part of the army
(ANA) or air force (AAF). The current GSG6 budget builder is populated with communication professionals and can effectively build budgets for those requirements.
However, when it comes to aviation unique requirements (i.e. aviation fuel, aircraft
platform procurement, aircraft contractor logistics support, etc.), there is no current
mechanism in place. This has not been a problem in the past because the nascent
air force was being built, and the overwhelming majority of aviation unique items
were off-budget and therefore budgeted and procured through US processes. As of
2016, the only on-budget aviation unique items are aviation fuel and some unique
aviation training. These two items are currently budgeted through the GSG4 for aviation fuel and the GSG7 for aviation training.
Understanding the current issues with the on-budget aviation fuel requirement is
illustrative of the greater problem. The GSG4, as the budget builder for aviation
fuel, has the responsibility to build the requirement, develop the spending plan,
and has a critical role in supporting the payment process upon contract award. The
GSG4, however, is responsible for ground fuel in addition to aviation fuel (among
many other items). As a result, in the financial system, the GSG4 combines the
budget dollars for aviation and ground fuel.17 Historically, there have been shortages
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in ground fuel that resulted in a myriad of problems such as electricity loss for
weeks on end at various military installations.18 The reasons for fuel shortages often
lead back to corruption.19 Fuel is diverted and sold on the black market. Unauthorized vehicles are filled with fuel, and even those vehicles that are authorized are
used inappropriately for personal reasons.20 This is not a problem that would be
solved through additional budgetary dollars as the current allocation is theoretically
sufficient if utilized and accounted for properly. Due to the shortages, it is better for
the GSG4 to keep all fuel (ground, aviation, etc.) aggregated in the accounting system to keep the problem opaque and preserve internal priorities. Recall that the
GSG4 is comprised of ANA professionals, and the six corps are under ANA command. The GSG4, therefore, receives constant pressure from its ANA brethren in
the six corps to meet ground fuel needs. The tendency is to prioritize ground fuel
needs over aviation needs. Ground fuel shortages are therefore addressed at the expense of aviation fuel needs. Despite pressure from coalition advisors, the GSG4
has been unwilling to separate the accounting for aviation fuel from the accounting
for ground fuel. Why? The simple answer is the transparency this type of accountability would provide is anathema to their objective.
The current accountability and transparency problems experienced by aviation
fuel are likely to be exasperated in the future. The extensive expansion of aviation
platforms (e.g. A-29, MD-530, C-208, etc.) in the past two years and plans for the induction of more aviation assets constitute a major turning point in fleet size and require a shift in the management of resources. These items and the associated aviation unique requirements that come with them (e.g. aircraft maintenance, spare
parts, pilot training, etc.) cannot be moved from off-budget to on-budget with effective accountability under the current system.
The second major resource allocation problem for the AAF revolves around authorities. The AAF does not have ownership over its requirements. As previously
discussed, authorities over requirements reside at the SBU level. As shown in Figure 3, the six corps are the only entities designated as SBUs in the MoD. AAF’s lack
of authority over requirements results in a lack of visibility, transparency, and accountability. It is imperative to understand that the suballotment of funds authority
resides at the SBU level and is coded as such in the accounting system. The Afghan
accounting system does not break out brigade and wing level units in their chart of
accounts.21 As a result, the AAF often ends up receiving not only less than their full
requirement but is often a less-than-proportional quantity than the pure army units
within the SBU. Because there is no transparency and visibility below the SBU
level—indicating the intention for the suballotted funds—the AAF has no recourse
to claim they did not receive their fair share.
The lack of authority negatively affects the AAF in other areas. All items (e.g.
printer cartridges, spare parts, etc.) procured for the ANA end up in depots. The
AAF lacks the authority to withdraw these items from the depots and track or manage
their allotment of resources. It is another area where corruption is problematic.
The lack of authority also affects allotment training and travel requirements. The
AAF does not have the authority to approve orders but instead must request travel to
attend training from its parent organizations. Placing this authority outside the AAF
not only results in time delays but also the potential for disapproval by nonaviation
10 | Air & Space Power Journal
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professionals who do not fully understand the importance of the travel and training. This affects the human capital in the AAF. Lastly, the lack of authority results
in duplicative processes for reporting. AAF units report through their wings to both
the AAF HQ and the parent corps in which they reside. This duplicative reporting
wastes resources.
In summary, the resource allocation problems the AAF is experiencing today
come down to three issues. First, there is not a MoD-level entity that functions to
serve aviation equities in the resource allocation process. Second, the AAF does not
have ownership or authority over their requirements because this authority resides
at the corps (SBU) level. And third, the current resource allocation construct exasperates the widespread corruption problems in the MOD.

Solution: A New Construct for the AAF
This research finds that there are two primary changes that can alleviate the
problems the AAF is experiencing in the resource allocation process. First, a change
is needed at the MoD level to account for all unique aviation requirements. This
can be accomplished through the establishment of an aviation budget builder (ABB)
as a new entity. This MoD level ABB would add to the 13 current budget builders as
a new, 14th budget builder. The ABB would serve as the financial focal point at the
MoD level, providing a holistic aviation picture to leadership. Reporting would be
more efficient and streamlined. Additionally, as more and more aviation unique
items transition from off- to on-budget, the criticality of an ABB increases. The current MoD financial construct is not designed to handle this transition. The ABB fills
the impending gap in the process.
Corruption must also be considered. Visibility, transparency, and accountability
would be greatly enhanced with an ABB as allotments of funds would have aviation
coded designators. The result is a reduction in corruption as transparency increases. This transparency would flow over to the corps also, as aviation items such
as aviation fuel would no longer be bundled with other ground fuels. Thus, increased transparency and accountability of ground fuel transactions would be a positive second order effect of this change.
The second change suggested by this research is to designate the AAF as an
SBU. This change necessarily entails breaking the AAF out from under the corps
from a financial standpoint. The authorities conferred to the AAF as an SBU would
result in air force control over their requirements. Coupled with the ABB, the AAF
would have complete visibility, transparency, and accountability in the resource
allocation process. Additionally, three other authority issues previously discussed
would be solved. First, the AAF as an SBU would have the ability to place and remove items from the depots. This would result in better accountability and less
corruption. Second, human capital would be enhanced as training would be controlled by the AAF. The AAF would generate orders and have full control over the
timing and placement of individuals into training programs. Lastly, reporting
would be streamlined. The duplicative reports that go through both the corps and
HQ AAF would cease to exist. Reporting would only be necessary through the AAF
Summer 2017 | 11
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channels. Figure 4 shows the new construct with both the ABB and AAF as an SBU
construct implemented together.
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Figure 4. New construct with ABB and AAF with SBU authorities

As shown in Figure 4, the requirements from the wings no longer flow through
the corps as previously shown in Figure 3. Instead, all requirements in Budget Circular No. 122 flow from the wings directly to the AAF HQ as the SBU. This results in
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a single line of reporting. Once requirements are consolidated at the AAF SBU, the
unique aviation requirements flow up to the newly established aviation budget
builder. It is important to recall that only the aviation unique requirements flow
through the ABB. All nonaviation unique requirements would flow from the wings
to the AAF SBU but then flow to their currently established budget builder. For example, while aviation fuel (an aviation unique requirement) would flow from the
AAF SBU to the ABB, computers (a nonaviation unique requirement) would flow
from the AAF SBU directly to the GSG6 budget builder. The remainder of the requirements generation process remains unchanged with requirements flowing from
the budget builders to the MoD–F and MoF. Budget authority then flows back down
through the Budget Circular No. 2 process. However, the allotment of funds now
flows down through the ABB to the AAF as an SBU. Accountability and transparency for AAF requirements are achieved. The AAF SBU and ABB are therefore complementary entities in the MoD resource allocation process. Together they provide
a holistic, seamless approach to AAF requirement generation and budget execution.

Discussion
Timing is important when implementing change. That window of opportunity is
open. AAF personnel and processes are currently postured to successfully transition to a fully functioning SBU. Despite lacking SBU authorities, coalition personnel
have been actively training AAF personnel on the processes necessary to succeed.
For example, in 2016 the AAF developed their own requirements (more than 22,000
line items) for the first time.23 As a result, AAF personnel were invited to participate
in the MoD-level program working groups that are responsible for developing Budget
Circular No. 1. AAF participation in the Budget Circular No. 1 process demonstrated
the capacity to function as an SBU, despite lacking the authority to be an SBU. Participation in the process without authority is valuable to develop and demonstrate competency, however, without authority it is an exercise in futility. Accountability and
transparency cannot be improved without the necessary authorities in the resource
allocation process.
Manning and organizational change are also necessary to implement the change
to SBU authority for the AAF. These changes are already in motion. The AAF has
postured itself during the past two years with incremental changes to the Tashkil to
organizationally align personnel to operate as an SBU. (The Tashkil is the official
list of required ANA and AAF personnel by position and rank.) Thus, the AAF has
the manpower capacity to operate as an SBU if given the authority.
Similarly, the time is right for the establishment of a MoD-level ABB. The aviation
portfolio is rapidly expanding with more aircraft platforms and larger quantities of
existing platforms being added to the existing portfolio. These platforms and their
associated training and maintenance are all currently resourced off-budget. The
transition of these items from off- to on-budget is the ultimate coalition goal. But to
effectively transition, a mechanism needs to be in place that allows for visibility, accountability, and transparency. The establishment of an ABB meets that need. Making
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the change now sets the AAF up for success as the air portfolio expands and enables
a phased transition of items from off- to on-budget in future years.
Official approval of an ABB and the AAF as an SBU through MoD channels may
be the easier task. Implementation will be difficult. The coalition advisor role complicates this process. Because donor nations provide the overwhelming majority of
funds, the coalition advisors have significant influence over the MoD. These coalition
advisors, however, have continual turnover with tours in Afghanistan that typically
range from six months to one year. The momentum an advisor group builds toward
achieving an initiative is often slowed or stopped by the inevitable personnel turnover.
Additionally, Afghan culture is an impediment to implementation. Culturally,
Afghans do not typically say “no.” Rather, they will concur with a proposal, but they
do not necessarily implement it. Previous research demonstrates that culture
shapes human behavior and indicates cultural changes are slow to occur. Research
by Douglas C. North found that informal constraints (norms of behavior, self-imposed
codes of conduct, etc.) comprise the institutions that “are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.”24 While Oliver E. Williamson finds that
customs, traditions, and norms take 100–1,000 years to change.25 Thus, it would not
be surprising if the ABB and SBU were agreed upon in principle and codified as policy
but simply ignored. To be clear, we are not suggesting it would be ignored by individuals in the AAF. Our interviews indicate that the AAF recognizes the problems
and are advocates for the solution presented here. Rather, it is the reality that the
AAF resides within the ANA that may be problematic. While ANA members have
not explicitly stated they are opposed to these changes, they also have not been actively pursuing change. Thus, coupling cultural inertia with the coalition advisor
turnover problem is a potential risk to the successful implementation of the ABB
and SBU initiatives. We are, however, cautiously optimistic that these obstacles can
be overcome. The benefits of ABB and SBU authorities are too significant to default
to the status quo. The structural changes in Afghan financial and procurement processes indicated herein can alleviate the resource problems the AAF is experiencing and at the same time help to reduce corruption in the MOD. 
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